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MANSLAUGHTER AND THE ADEQUACY OF
PROVOCATION: THE REASONABLENESS
OF THE REASONABLE MAN
"[The law of provocation] is a compromise, neither conceding
the propriety of the act nor exacting the full penalty for it. This
being so, how can it be admitted that that paragon of virtue, the
reasonable man, gives way to provocation?" '
The law states that every killing of a human being, when committed by
another human being, is a homicide. 2 However, not every homicide is a
crime. In certain situations the taking of human life is justifiable since the
killing is done without fault.3 Under other circumstances the homicide is
said to be excusable, meaning that the slayer is at fault, although he is not
punished for this act. 4 Those homicides which are neither excusable nor
justifiable are considered to be felonious. They are either murder or
manslaughter.
Murder at common law was said to be the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought, express or implied.5 Today, although some states have by statute retained the common-law definition of
murder,( or one similar to it, 7 most jurisdictions within the United States

have divided the crime into degrees. Generally, murder in the first degree
requires that there be an actual intent to kill and the elements of premeditation and deliberation be present or that the homicide be committed in the
perpetration of certain felonies.8 Murder in the second degree most often
includes the other homicides which would be punished as murder at
1. Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRmn. L. REv. 740, 742.
2. CLArP & MARsHALL, CimIs 300 (5th ed. 1952).
3. E.g., killing to prevent the commission of a felony. See generally id. §§ 267-72.
4. E.g., killing in self-defense where the slayer is not entirely free from fault in
engaging in the altercation. See id. at 370-74.
5. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295 (1850).
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1002 (1935); ME. Rzv. STA. ANN. c. 130, § 1 (1954);
S.C. CoDE § 16-51 (1952).
7. Ky. Rzv. STAT. § 435.010 (1948): "Any person who commits willful murder
shall be punished by . . ."; Miss. ConE ANN. § 2215 (1957): "The killing of a
human being.. . by any means or in any manner, shall be murder in the following
cases: (a) When done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed,

or of any human being; (b) ...
depraved heart . . .; (c) . . . [felony murder].
."; OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (1937) : "Homicide is murder when perpetrated

without authority of law, and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the
person killed, or of any other human being." TEN)x. PEN. CoDE ANN. art. 1256 (1936) :
'Whoever shall voluntarily kill any person within this state shall be guilty of murder."
8. E.g., AnRz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 13-451 (1956); CAL. ANN. CODE tit. 8,
§ 189 (West 1955); IowA CODE ANN. § 690.2 (1950); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27 § 407
(1951) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (1954).
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common law.9 The line of demarcation between first and second degree
murder is generally drawn at the point where there is a failure of proof
of deliberation or premeditation.'" It is therefore said to be second degree
murder when the slayer acts under great passion sufficient to show the
In this area, where there is
absence of premeditation or deliberation."
evidence of passion and provocation, the definitions of murder in the second
degree and manslaughter come very close together. If passion is present
in some measure, it may be sufficient to reduce the crime from first degree
to second degree murder. If it is present in greater measure, the crime
may be reduced to manslaughter.
Doctrinally, it is the absence of malice which distinguishes manslaughter from murder.' 2 This simple definition, which has been codified
by most state statutes,' 3 produces difficulties which arise when an attempt
is made to apply the definition to a given state of facts. The determination
of whether malice was present in the act of homicide resolves itself into the
question of "whether the accused was subjected to such provocation by the
deceased as to cause sudden hot blood or passion, as a result of which his
reason was so disturbed or obscured that he acted rashly, without deliberation or reflection and from passion rather than judgment." 14 In order to
answer this question, a determination must be made with regard to three
factors implicit in the question itself: (1) was the provocation adequate
to produce a state of passion in the mind of the slayer; (2) was there
time before the fatal act was committed for the passion to have cooled;
(3) did the slayer act because he was governed by that passion or was
malice the propelling force in his action?
The law states that the first factor, the adequacy of the provocation,
must be determined by an objective standard-was the provocation adequate
to produce passion so overpowering as to cause a reasonable man under
the same circumstances to kill? It is the purpose of this Note to examine
this factor, its standard, the law which has flowed from it, and some
recommendations for change.
9. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.020 (1953) ; N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 585:1 (1955);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:113-2 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-24-4 (1953); UTA~r
CODE ANN. §76-30-3 (1953).
10. MIRLa, CRIMINAL LAW § 90 (1934). See Justice Cardozo's criticism of this
vague distinction in CARDOZO, LAW AND LITtRATURz 99-100 (1931).
11. See, e.g., People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 159 N.E. 390 (1927), where the
court reversed a first degree murder conviction on the ground that the evidence indicated second degree murder or manslaughter.
12. MxSR, op. cit. supra note 10, § 91.
13. E.g., ARIZ. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 13-455 (1956) ; CAL. ANN. CODS tit. 8,
§ 192 (West 1955); Nm. Rsv. STAT. § 28-403 (1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-7
(1953); S.C. CODS § 16-55 (1952). Some states have degrees of manslaughter, e.g.,
ALA. COD ANN. tit. 14 § 320 (1940); KAN. GSN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-407, 21411,
21-413, 21-419 (1949) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 619.15, 619.18 (1947) ; N.Y. PSN. LAw
§§ 1050, 1052, while other states have no statutory definition of manslaughter, e.g.,
Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Jersey, and North Carolina.
14. Mnxam, op. cit. supra note 10, § 92.
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THE ADEQUACY OF PROVOCATION
THE REASONABLE MAN

The celebrated English case of Regina v. Welsh 11 saw the introduction

of the reasonable man into the law of homicide. " ' In order to reduce the
killing to manslaughter by reason of provocation, the jury was instructed
by justice Keating to determine whether the evidence pointed up facts from
which the homicide could be attributed "to the violence of passion naturally
arising therefrom, and likely to be aroused thereby in the breast of a
reasonable man." 17 This inyasion of the criminal law by an "individual"
whose stature had previously been associated with tort liability in the field8
of negligence, was quickly recognized by the courts in the United States.'
The century which has passed since the Welsh decision has seen a
unanimous application by the American courts of the reasonable man
standard. Despite the fact that psychiatry has attained a recognized
position in other areas of the law, 19 the criminal courts refuse to consider
the application of a subjective test in determining the adequacy of provocation.2 0 The application by the courts of an objective doctrine has led to
the establishment of certain concrete standards of conduct which a reasonable man is said to adhere to. Unfortunately many of these incidents have
ossified into ironclad rules originally evolved in the nineteenth century.
Under modern law, the categories of things which provoked the nineteenth
century reasonable man continue to provoke the reasonable man of the
twentieth century with the addition of a few new but rigid categories.
In general, he is said to be provoked into taking human life when he is
violently assaulted; when an unlawful attempt is made to arrest him; when
he kills in mutual combat; or when he sees his wife in an act of adultery
and kills her or her paramour. 2 ' On the other hand, he is said not to be
provoked by insulting words or gestures, nor, according to some authorities,
is he provoked by a trespass against his land or goods.2 The outcome of
the case which clearly falls within one of these rules may be predicted with
a high degree of accuracy. However, the situations which develop are
seldom clear cut. Some courts carefully scrutinize the evidence to determine
if the facts can be forced into any of the established categories; 2 if they
15. 11 Cox Cr. Cas. 336 (1869).

16. Williams, mspra note 1, at 741.
17. 11 Cox Cr. Cas. at 338.
18. See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220 (1862), decided some seven years

before the Welsh case, where Judge Christiancy used a standard which very closely
approaches the test of the "reasonable man."
19. Where early cases refused to allow recovery in negligence suits for damages
due to emotional disturbance, see, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45
N.E. 354 (1896), today at least seventeen states recognize such recovery. PRossaa,
ToRTs 38-47 (2d ed. 1955). This stems from the courts' confidence that psychiatrists
are now able to offer sufficiently accurate aid in distinguishing between real and
false claims for damages.
20. E.g., Hart v. United States, 130 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1942); People v.
Danielly, 33 Cal. 2d 362, 202 P.2d 18 (1949); Bedder v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 1119.
21. CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 2, § 256.
22. Ibid.
23. E.g., State v. Smith, 240 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Mo. 1951); State v. Wynn, 21
N.J. 264, 121 A.2d 534 (1956).
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cannot, the case is not one for manslaughter regardless of evidence of actual
provocation or passion. The result has been an unrealistic interpretation
of the facts to fit an appealing case neatly within an established category,
thus leading to confusion as to the breath of the categories and lack of
uniformity in the application of the law. Other jurisdictions have refused
to saddle themselves with the "nineteenth century four" and have created
some few new categories of adequate provocation as the cases arise. To
make a proper appraisal of this application of the law it is first necessary
to examine in detail the contemporary doctrines defining the types of
provocation sufficient to submit a case of felonious homicide to the jury
on a theory of manslaughter.
WHAT Is

ADEQUATE PROVOCATION?THE LAW IN THE AREA

Assault
Anger
In the eighteenth century an assault accompanied by a battery which
was "sufficient to kindle the blood," as distinguished from a slight blow, was
adequate provocation to reduce a felonious homicide from murder to
manslaughter 2 4 American cases differ greatly as to what type of an
assault is necessary before a reasonable man becomes provoked. There
are jurisdictions such as Missouri which hold that any assault short of
an actual battery is not sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter. In
State v. Kizer 2 the deceased was shot and killed after chasing the defendant
with an axe. The court affirmed a conviction of second degree murder
on the ground that the evidence did not show an actual battery. The
same conclusion was reached in State v. Biswell2 6 where a stool was
thrown at the defendant but it missed him. He immediately shot the
deceased. The court inferred that the decision would have been different
27
had the stool struck the slayer.

Opposed to the Missouri interpretation is a
hold that an assault alone will mitigate a crime
slaughter. In Davis v. State 28 an Alabama court
be adequate provocation when an assault is either

line of decisions which
from murder to manstated that there would
actually committed "or

24. See Fosrat, CROWN LAW 292 (1767); Coldiron, Historical Development of
Manislaughter,38 Ky. L.J. 527, 541 (1950).

25. 360 Mo. 744, 230 S.W.2d 690 (1950).
26. 352 Mo. 698, 179 S.W.2d 61 (1944).
27. 352 Mo. at 709, 179 S.W.2d at 66; see State v. Delbono, 306 Mo. 553, 561,
268 S.W. 60, 62 (1924) (dictum) ; cf. State v. Porter, 357 Mo. 405, 208 S.W.2d 240
(1948), where the court reversed a conviction of murder in the second degree,
holding that the lower court erred in not instructing the jury as to manslaughter
since there was an actual assault and battery upon the defendant.
28. 214 Ala. 273, 107 So. 737 (1926).
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menaced under such circumstances as reasonably convince the mind that
the accused had cause to believe, and did believe, that he would be presently
assaulted . ..
20 A Kentucky court held that it was not error for the
trial court to instruct the jury as to manslaughter after the defendant
testified that he had not been struck by the deceased at the time of the
killing but that the deceased came at him "acting like he was going to strike
",

[him] ." 30

In addition to the two mentioned lines of decisions there are cases
which appear to be decided on what may be termed "non-legal" grounds.
They are cases in which the defendant has been the victim of an assault
and battery by the deceased but, because of the brutality shown by the
defendant, the court withdraws the question of manslaughter from jury
consideration, leaving them the sole choice of murder or acquittal. A
first degree murder conviction was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Webb.3 ' There, defendant's wife, who was
much the larger of the two, hit the defendant over the head with a poker
during a row. The defendant picked up a razor and ended the life of his
spouse by cutting her throat. The appellate court disposed of the defense
contention that the trial court erred in not defining manslaughter for the
jury with the conclusion that the blow received by the defendant was, as
a matter of law, not sufficient provocation. After consideration of the size
of the bump which the poker blow raised on his head, the case was found
to be within the sub-category of slight or technical battery, a somewhat
unusually refined analysis of the category and its subdivisions.
Fear
In most of the above situations, the defense contention was that the
assault upon the defendant caused him to become so angry that he killed
while under the influence of passion and without malice. Closely related
to this defense is the doctrine, followed in most jurisdictions, that "fear"
as well as "anger" may reduce a homicide to manslaughter.3 2 Most often
the doctrine of fear will come into play when an assault has been made upon
the defendant. This is clearly indicated in the leading case of Stevenson v.
United States m where the Supreme Court stated that ". . . an assault
upon another by means of firing a pistol at him . . . is naturally calcu-

lated to excite some kind of passion in the one upon whom such an assault
is made. It might be one of anger or it might be terror." 3 4 And in
Commonwealth v. Flax,3 5 where the defendant was assaulted by the de29. 214 Ala. at 277, 107 So. at 740.
30. Sikes v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 429, 200 S.W.2d 956 (1947).

31. 252 Pa. 187, 97 At. 189 (1916).
32. E.g., Reeves v. State, 186 Ala. 14, 65 So. 160 (1914) ; State v. Buonomo, 87
Conn. 285, 87 Atl. 977 (1913).
33. 162 U.S. 313 (1896).

34. 162 U.S. at 322.
35. 331 Pa. 145, 200 At. 632 (1938).
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ceased, it was indicated that "just as malice is the impelling power of
murder, either anger or rage or resentment or terror is the impelling power
of voluntary manslaughter." 3 6
It seems apparent that fear more easily than anger will stem from an
assault unaccompanied by a battery. It is more natural for an individual
to be overcome by fear once he has been subjected to an assault than to
visualize a situation whereby an assault without any touching creates an
uncontrollable anger.
Nevertheless, Missouri once again refuses to
mitigate the homicide when there is an absence of actual touching. In
State v. Ferguson37 defendant's husband came into her room, stated he
was going to kill her and upraised two sticks preparatory to striking her.
Defendant shot and killed him. The court, in affirming a conviction of
murder in the second degree, held that the trial court did not err in
refusing to instruct the jury as to manslaughter since the deceased never
actually struck the defendant and therefore there was not sufficient provocation for a manslaughter instruction.
A minority of jurisdictions adhere in principle to the Missouri doctrine
by refusing to permit a manslaughter instruction when the issue of fear
is raised. California 3 8 and Illinois,39 along with Missouri, 40 reason that
circumstances which produce fear in the mind of the defendant raise an
issue of self-defense and preclude any issue of manslaughter. The jury is
then forced to decide between a verdict of murder or acquittal.
Most courts, however, recognize that instructions as to provocation
and self-defense may co-exist. 41 The doctrine, as it developed in New
Mexico, is indicative of other jurisdictions as well. The situation first arose
in State v. Kidd 2 where the defendant after being convicted of manslaughter appealed on the ground that the evidence required a verdict of
self-defense or murder. The defendant had been engaging in adultery with
the wife of the deceased. At a meeting between the defendant and the
deceased, it appeared to the defendant that the deceased was reaching for
a gun with which to kill him, so the defendant acted first. The court,
affirming the manslaughter conviction, concluded that:
"This situation, together with [defendant's] guilty knowledge of
past illicit relations with the wife of the deceased, was sufficient, if the
36. 331 Pa. at 155, 200 Atl. at 637. (Emphasis added.)
37. 353 Mo. 46, 182 S.W.2d 38 (1944). See State v. Kizer, 360 Mo. 744, 230
S.W.2d 690 (1950).
38. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 14 Cal. 2d 237, 93 P.2d 121 (1939) ; People v.
Manzo, 9 Cal. 2d 594, 72 P2d 119 (1937).
39. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 404 Ill. 350, 88 N.E.2d 834 (1949).
40. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 240 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1951) ; State v. Crouch, 124
S.W.2d 1185, 1188 (Mo. 1938).
41. E.g., Gourko v. United States, 153 U.S. 183 (1894); Kinard v. United
States, 96 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ; Gallegos v. People, 316 P2d 884 (Colo. 1957) ;
Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 80 Atl. 571 (1911); State v. Rish, 104
S.C. 250, 88 S.E. 531 (1916) ; State v. Crawford, 66 W. Va. 114, 66 S.E. 110 (1909).
42. 24 N.M. 572, 175 Pac. 772 (1917).
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jury so believed, to cause in his mind such a state of terror as to
deprive him, temporarily, of judging and viewing the situation in a
calm and reasonable manner." 4
This reasoning was followed in State v. Wright 44 where it appeared to
the defendant that the deceased was reaching for a gun at the time the
homicide took place. The doctrine was extended to its ultimate conclusion
in State v. Simpson 45 when the court stated that ". . . it will be generally
true that evidence requiring submission of self-defense will call for a submission of voluntary manslaughter." 46
Although the distinction between a homicide which amounts to
voluntary manslaughter because of fear and one which is excusable or
justifiable in self-defense is quite vague, it nevertheless exists.
"The dividing line between self-defense and [voluntary manslaughter] seems to be the existence, as the moving force, of a reasonably founded belief of imminent peril to life or great bodily harm, as
distinguished from the influence of an uncontrollable fear or terror,
conceivable as existing, but not reasonably justified by the immediate
circumstances. If the circumstances are both adequate to raise and
sufficiently to justify a belief in the necessity to take life in order to
save oneself from such a danger, where the belief exists and is. acted
upon, the homicide is excusable upon the theory of self-defense .
while, if the act is committed under the influence of uncontrollable fear
of death or great bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but without
the presence of all the ingredients necessary to excuse the act on the
ground of self-defense, the killing is manslaughter." 47
The highest court of Georgia, in a recent homicide decision, 48 chose to
distinguish self-defense and manslaughter on the reasoning that "'if one
kills another under the fears of a reasonable man, that the deceased was
manifestly intending to commit a personal injury upon him, amounting to
a felony, the killing is justifiable homocide; if the prisoner is under similar
fears of some injury less than a felony, the offense is manslaughter and not
murder.' "49
In State v. Nargashian,0 a Rhode Island court refused to mitigate the
crime to manslaughter where the defendant killed a person while under
43. 24 N.M. at 577, 175 Pac. at 774.

44. 38,N.M. 427, 34 P2d 870 (1934).
45. 39 N.M. 271, 46 P.2d 49 (1935).
46. 39 N.M. at 273, 46 P.2d at 50. See State v. Plummer, 44 N.M. 614, 107
P.2d 319, 321 (1940) which affirms the Simpson decision.
47. Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 352, 80 At. 571, 574 (1911).
48. McDaniel v. State, 209 Ga. 827, 76 S.E.2d 500 (1953).
49. Id. at 834-35, 76 S.E.2d at 506.
50. 26 R.I. 299, 58 Atl. 953 (1904). See Dow v. State, 77 Ark. 464, 92 S.W. 28
(1906), where the court refused to recognize provocation by a third party.
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the influence of fear from a third party. Here the defendant was ordered
to kill the ultimate victim by threats of his own extermination if he refused.
The reasoning of the court appears to have been that this type of conduct
is so reprehensible that the punishment should not be mitigated, despite
the fact that the defendant may have acted with a total absence of malice.
Illegal Arrest
In general " . . if one kills an officer of justice . . . in the
execution of his duty . . . knowing his authority or the intention with

which he interposes, the law will imply malice, and the killer shall be
guilty of murder." "- The law will not recognize any form of provocation
in a situation where the arrest was legal.52 This policy attempt to protect
law enforcement officers extends even to situations where the defendant,
acting under a mistake of fact as to the legality of the arrest, is provoked
into taking the life of the officer.Illegal arrests present a different
problem.
Once again as in the assault area the jurisdictions are not in complete
agreement as to how a reasonable man will react to a law enforcement
officer who attempts to make an illegal arrest. There are three schools
of thought on this subject.
There are jurisdictions which hold that an illegal arrest always reduces
murder to manslaughter unless there is express malice on the part of the
defendant.5 4 The courts here initially focus upon the actions of the
arresting officer. Once it is established that his attempt to arrest was
illegal, the defendant's motive in committing the homicide is determined
in order to ascertain whether express malice existed. "Express malice
means an actual state of mind existing in the heart of the defendant
towards the [arresting officer] of ill will, or hatred, or dislike, or kindred
feelings. . .

." 5

Some jurisdictions phrase this doctrine in terms of a

presumption that an illegal arrest arouses passion in the victim sufficient
to reduce the killing from murder to manslaughter, thus emphasizing the
state's burden of proof of actual malice.5 6
A second view with regard to illegal arrest is one which places the
burden upon the defendant. In order to reduce the killing from murder to
51. 4 BLAcKSTON, COMMP.NTARImS *200. But see State v. Weisengoff, 85 W. Va.
271, 101 S.E. 450 (1919), where a police officer, after jumping on the running board
of defendant's car, in order to make a lawful arrest, was killed when the car crashed
into a bridge. The court stated that in order to find the defendant guilty of murder,
it was necessary for the jury to believe that the defendant intentionally killed the
police officer.
52. Dickey, Culpable Homicides in Resisting Arrest, 18 CORMLL L.Q., 373, 374
(1933).
53. Id. at 375-76.
54. E.g., Brown v. United States, 159 U.S. 100 (1895) ; State v. Burnett, 357 Mo.
106, 206 S.W.2d 345 (1947); see 7 MINN. L. Rtv. 409 (1923).
55. Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 407, 95 N.E. 868, 872 (1911).
56. E.g., Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554, 565 (1886).
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manslaughter, he must show that he acted in the heat of passion which in
57
fact stemmed from the illegality of the arrest.
The third position is that hot blood aroused by an illegal arrest will
not reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter. It is difficult to determine how far this view really extends since the few cases so holding have
dealt with situations where the deceased was a uniformed officer and the
illegality of the arrest stemmed from the fact that the arrest warrant was
defective. 8 Perhaps the courts would have reached different results had the
defendants been unaware of the fact that the parties attempting the arrests
were police officers.
One factor which ought to be of prime significance, but is rarely given
attention in this area, is whether or not the defendant was in fact guilty
of the crime which resulted in the officer's attempt to apprehend him. 9
It would seem that an innocent individual is more likely to be genuinely
provoked by the illegality of the arrest and not act out of malice than a
person who is guilty of the crime under investigation.
Infidelity of the Spouse
From the time of Mannings Case 0 until the present, the law has
generally been in agreement that, if a husband discovers his wife in the act
of adultery and he kills her or her paramour, the provocation is so great
that the law will not punish him for murder.0 ' However, the sight of his
wife's adultery will not reduce a murder to manslaughter if he commits the
act with malice. The California case of People v. Gingell 62 and the New
Jersey case of State v. Agnesi6 3 are examples of homicides committed
with malice. In both cases the courts affirmed convictions of murder when
the evidence disclosed that defendants, suspecting their wives of infidelity,
57. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 26 N.M. 353, 192 Pac. 483 (1920).
58. See, e.g., Alsop v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 547 (1882).
59. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 286 Ill. 108, 121 N.E. 246 (1918); Brooks v.
Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869).
60. Raym, Sir T. 212 (1793): "The jury... [found] that the said Manning
found the person killed committing adultery with his wife in the very act, and
flung a jointed stool at him, and with the same killed him; and resolved by the whole
court, that this was but manslaughter; and Manning had his clergy at the bar, and
was burned in the hand; and the court directed the executioner to burn him gently,
because there could not be greater provocation than this."
61. It is interesting to note that Georgia, whose homicide statute is a codification
of the common law, regards the killing of the paramour by the enraged spouse as
being justifiable homicide. Campbell v. State, 204 Ga. 399, 403, 49 S.E.2d 867, 870
(1948). Texas had an express statute to that effect which has since been repealed.
See Billings v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 338, 277 S.W. 687 (1925). Delaware has a
statutory provision which provides that if it is found by a jury that the defendant
was guilty of manslaughter in killing a person found in the act of adultery with his
wife, then such defendant shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 and
imprisoned for not more than one year. (Other manslaughter convictions are punishable by fines up to $10,000 or imprisonment up to thirty years or both.) D4L. CoDe
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 575 (a), (b) (1953).
62. 211 Cal. 532, 296 Pac. 70 (1931) (first degree murder conviction upheld).
63. 92 N.J.L. 53, 104 Atl. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 92 N.J.L. 638, 108 Atl. 115
(1919) (second degree murder conviction upheld).
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bought guns for the express purpose of surprising their wives in the act
of adultery.
There is authority for the proposition that, if a husband discovers his
wife under circumstances which make it reasonably appear that she is
guilty of adultery and he kills the paramour, the law will recognize this
as manslaughter despite the fact that his belief was mistaken.6 Jurists who
refuse to support this rule of law contend that there must be an actual
adultery, for otherwise an intentional unlawful killing of a person who has
done the slayer no wrong would only be punished as manslaughter.6
This dissent from the weight of authority appears to lose sight of the fact
that the crucial issue is the slayer's state of mind and not the guilt or
innocence of the victim.
There is lack of uniformity in the decisions with regard to the question
of whether or not the reasonable man becomes sufficiently provoked, when
he is told that his wife has been unfaithful, as to deserve an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter. Courts faced with a case of provocation by anything less than the defendant visually learning of the deed find it difficult
to overcome the general common-law rule that "words alone are never
sufficient provocation." 66 The outcome of the case in jurisdictions rigidly
adhering to that rule will not be affected by the fact that the wife herself
reveals her adulterous act to the defendant 0 17 as compared with situations
in which the husband learns of his wife's conduct from other persons. 8
Other states, although they follow the general rule that "words alone
are not sufficient," carve out an exception to this principle when a husband
is informed of his wife's unfaithfulness. In so doing, these courts do not
attempt to make a distinction as to the source from which the knowledge
comes. A friend who informs the defendant of the misconduct6 9 is able
to ignite the spark of passion equally as well as the deceiving spouse who
makes a confession.70 It is interesting to note that American courts have
created the dichotomy of "yes" or "no" in this area without further refinement by an inquiry into the source of the slayer's information and the
identity of the victim upon whom the wrath of the slayer is laid. Is the
heat of passion aroused in the breast of a reasonable man with the same
intensity when a disinterested third party tells him that his wife is unfaithfull as it is when the words come from his wife herself? And is it of any
64. State v. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 50 Atl. 37 (1901) ; Maher v. People, 10 Mich.
212 (1862) ; Sweat v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 287, 178 S.W. 554 (1915).
65. State v. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 185, 50 Atl. 37, 40 (1901) (dissenting opinion);
Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 228 (1862) (dissenting opinion).
66. See discussion of words as provocation at pp. 1032-34 infra.
67. E.g., People v. Ashland, 20 Cal. App. 168, 128 Pac. 798 (1912); Stevens v.
State, 137 Ga. 520, 73 S.E. 737 (1912).
68. E.g., State v. Bone, 114 Iowa 537, 87 N.W. 507 (1901).
69. See, e.g., Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
70. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52, 111 S.W.2d 445 (1937);
Haley v. State, 123 Miss. 87, 85 So. 129 (1920); State v. Martin, 57 S.E.2d 55
(S.C. 1949), 11 U. PiTT. L. Rsv. 709 (1950).
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significance that the defendant takes the life of his wife rather than seeking
out her paramour?
Although courts have seen no distinction in whether a provoked
defendant kills his wife or her paramour when he is told of the misconduct,
distinctions do exist in the situation where the slayer discovers the parties
in the act. Prior to 1936 Texas had a statute which provided that it was
justifiable homicide if the defendant killed his wife's paramour after
surprising him in the act of adultery. 71 A Texas court, however, refused
to extend this protection to a defendant who killed his wife, rather than
her paramour, when the defendant discovered the two engaging in
adulterous conduct.7
In Delaware, in order for a homicide to be manslaughter under circumstances of adultery, it is necessary for the defendant to find his wife in
the act of adultery or in such circumstances as to indicate with reasonable
certainty to a rational mind that she had just then committed adultery, or
was about to commit it.73 The crime is manslaughter whether the defendant kills his wife or her paramour. However, the Delaware statute which
fixes the punishment for manslaughter distinguishes between a homicide in
which the defendant takes the life of his wife ($10,000 fine and thirty years
in prison) 74 and one in which the paramour is the victim ($100 fine and
one year in prison).75

Mutual Combat
Perhaps the earliest situations in which the common-law courts
recognized mitigation of murder to manslaughter was in the area of mutual
combat. The present day doctrine stems from the ancient legal concept of
homicide by chance-medley-death ensuing from a combat between the
parties upon a sudden quarrel. 76 Coke stated that the "killing of a man by
chance-medley is the killing of a man upon sudden brawle or contention by
chance." 77 The suddenness of the occasion was the element which reduced
78
the crime to manslaughter and led to the name of chance-medley.
Eventually the chance-medley doctrine gave way to the law of provocation 79
and, although there appears to have been a historical distinction between
mutual combat and provocation,80 mutual combat is treated by contemporary
71. Tr7. PrN. CoDm ANN. art. 1220 (1936).
72. Billings v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 338, 277 S.W. 687 (1925).
73. State v. Lee, 36 Del. (6 W.W. Harr.) 11, 171 Atl. 195 (Ct. Oyer & Ter.

1933).

74. Da. CODs ANN., tit. 11, § 575 (a) (1953).

75. Id. §575 (b).
76. See Snelling, Manlaughter Upon Chance-Medley, 31 AusTR. L.J. 102, 104
(1957).

77. CoKs, TiRDa
78. Id. at 55.

INSTITUTr

57 (6th ed. 1680).

79. See Note, 37 Ky. L.J. 86, 87-88 (1948).
80. Snelling, supra note 76, at 106.
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authorities as an act of provocation which gives rise to passion. 8' There
are, however, at least seven jurisdictions which attempt to retain the
distinction between the two. Their statutes state that manslaughter is
a homicide "upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion." 82
Although the mutual combat doctrine developed at an early date, there
are surprisingly few cases which turn upon that aspect of mahslaughter.
Most decisions involve a theory of passion arising from the law of provocation surrounding assault and battery.8 This may be traced somewhat
to the requirement that an individual, in order to take advantage of the
mutual combat doctrine, must not have sought the occasion for the purpose
of gratifying malice.8 4 A defendant can more easily demonstrate that he
was greatly angered or put into fear by the acts of the deceased than show
that the fight was a matter of chance and was not provoked by himself for
the purpose of taking human life.8
Words
In general, no words or gestures alone will sufficiently provoke a
reasonable man so as to reduce a homicide to manslaughter.8 6 However,
such conduct, accompanied by an assault, however slight, might be adequate
provocation.s 7 The refusal by most jurisdictions to accept words alone as
adequate provocation in any situation has led to some particularly harsh
results. The effect of this dogma in the area of infidelity of the spouse has
been previously noted.88
Perhaps the most striking example of a court finding it extremely
difficult to apply the "words alone" doctrine is illustrated by the Tennessee
case of Freddo v. State.8 9 Defendant in the early years of his life was
raised in an orphanage which taught him to behave in an exemplary
manner. He was eventually adopted by a woman who continued his fine
upbringing, impressing upon him the need to live a clean, religious life.
Defendant grew into manhood adhering to these principles. His strict
81. See, e.g., CLARK & MARSHALL, CRImES § 260, at 344 (5th ed. 1952), where
the doctrine of mutual combat is treated in the provocation section.
82. Aiz. R . STAT. ANN. § 13-456 (Supp. 1957) ; CAL. PZN. CODs ANN. tit. 8,
§ 192 (West 1955); IDAHO COns ANN. § 184006 (Supp. 1957); MONT. RSy. CoDFS
ANN. § 94-2507 (1947) ; NEn. Rtv. STAT. § 28-403 (1956) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-7
(1953) ; UTAH Cone ANN. § 76-30-5 (1953).
83. See text at pp. 1024-28 supra.
84. CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supranote 81, at 344.

85. It is recognized that the state will have the initial burden of showing that
the defendant arranged the altercation with the express purpose of engaging the
deceased in combat. However, it is not difficult to visualize situations in which a
modicum of evidence presented by the prosecution will quickly shift the burden to
the defendant.
86. CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 81, at 348. But see Wilson v. People,
4 Parker Crim. Rep. 619 (N.Y. 1859).
87. S mutPN, DIGCST OF THZ CRIMiNAL LAw 148-49 (1877). But see Commonwealth v. Cisneros, 381 Pa. 447, 451, 113 A.2d 293, 296 (1955).
88. See text at notes 66-68 supra.
89. 127 Tenn. 376, 155 S.W. 170 (1913).
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sense of morality caused him to develop an unusually strong aversion to
profanity. While working at his job in a railroad roundhouse, he encountered the deceased, a fellow worker, who had difficulty expressing himself
without the use of obscene phrases. When the deceased discovered that his
language was adversely affecting the defendant, he made a concerted effort
to direct his epithets at the defendant. One day he was permanently silenced
when the defendant struck him with a crowbar. Defendant was convicted
of murder in the second degree and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.
Although the Supreme Court of Tennessee admitted that its hands were tied
by the "words alone" rule and was therefore forced to affirm the conviction,
it attempted to overcome the apparent inadequacy of the rule by requesting
that the Governor commute the defendant's sentence.P0
In Commonwealth v. Cisneros"' defendant was convicted of murder
in the first degree. He appealed contending that the trial court erred in
withdrawing the issue of voluntary manslaughter from the jury on the
ground that there was evidence which warranted such an instruction. The
defendant was a half-Mexican, half-Puerto Rican, who was married to a
white woman, the deceased. A short time after their marriage the deceased
left her husband. The defendant, in an attempt at a reconciliation, went
to see her. His wife told him in very strong terms that she was no longer
going to live with him because he was half-Mexican and half-Puerto Rican
and she was afraid that if they had children they would be black. While
impressing this fact upon him, she attempted to emphasize it by continually
jabbing her finger into the defendant's shoulder. Angered by her words
and conduct, the defendant took her life. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirming the conviction stated that:
"The law of Pennsylvania is clear that no words of provocation,
reproach, abuse or slight assault are sufficient to free the party from
guilt of murder. The legal 'battery' committed in this case was of
a most trivial nature which, combined with the words used, is of no
moment in reducing the crime .to manslaughter." 92
The defendant in Plyntel v. State 93 was convicted of murder by a
Georgia court. At the time of the killing he lived with his wife and
children in the same small town as the deceased. It was brought to his
attention by some of his friends that the deceased was circulating stories
throughout the town to the effect that he, the deceased, was having intercourse with the defendant's wife whenever he wished to. In addition the
defendant was told that the deceased was telling all that there was grave
doubt as to the paternity of one of the defendant's children. The defendant,
enraged, went into town and shot the deceased. Although the murder con90.
91.
92.
93.

127 Tenn. at 386, 155 S.W. at 173.
381 Pa. 447, 113 A.2d 293 (1955).
381 Pa. at 451, 113 A.2d at 296.
164 Ga. 677, 139 S.E. 349 (1927).
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viction was reversed on other grounds, the highest court of Georgia in
dictum said that this evidence was insufficient to warrant a charge of
voluntary manslaughter to the jury. 4
It is interesting to note that in Texas, under a statute which existed
until 1936, if the defendant was informed that the deceased insulted one
of his female relatives that would be sufficient to reduce a killing to
manslaughter if he acted under passion from such information.9 5 However,
the statute provided in another section that insulting words or gestures
were not adequate provocation when made directly to the defendant.W
In 1936 both sections were repealed and the statute replacing it made
no mention of manslaughter. The following year a Texas court refusing
to adhere to the "words alone" doctrine stated: "It seems that the legislature by repealing the statute intended that insulting words or gestures
might be sufficient to constitute adequate [provocation] ." 97
Acts With Respect to Third Parties
The diversity of opinion among the various jurisdictions as to what
constitutes adequate provocation reaches almost chaotic dimensions in the
area of "acts upon third parties." Not only are the courts of different
states unable to agree but there is uncertainty within the jurisdictions
themselves.
In Pennsylvania the leading case on this subject is Commonwealth v.
Paese.9 s There, the defendant, after witnessing a fight between his friend
and the deceased in which his friend was severely beaten, shot and killed
the deceased. The court held as a matter of law that the injury to a
friend was not adequate provocation since a friend was not considered to be
of sufficiently close relationship. The court went on to say:
"[I]n general serious injury immediately inflicted or threatened, to
wife (or husband), child or servant will, on account of the relationship
of the parties, reduce the killing to manslaughter in similar cases as
if the injury had been to self." o"*
There was no mention made of the consequences which would befall an
individual who witnessed an injury inflicted upon his sister or brother and
then took the life of the guilty party. It was held in a case decided prior to
Paese that a brother, who discovered his sister in the act of adultery and
killed her paramour, was not entitled to a manslaughter instruction. 0 0
94. 164 Ga. at 678, 139 S.E. at 351. Georgia by statute incorporates the rule that
words alone are never sufficient to mitigate the crime of murder. See GA. CoD ANN.
§ 26-1007 (1935).
95. See Norman v. State, 26 Tex. App. 221, 9 S.W. 606 (1888).
96. E.g., Eckert v. State, 94 Tex. Crim. 395, 251 S.W. 804 (1923).
97. Elsmore v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 261, 264, 104 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1937).
98. 220 Pa. 371, 69 Atl. 891 (1908).
99. 220 Pa. at 375, 69 Atl. at 894.
100. Lynch v. Commonwealthb, 77 Pa. 205 (1874).

1958]

THE ADEQUACY OF PROVOCATION

However, in a more recent case where the defendant shot his sister's husband under a set of facts which appear to be less inciting, the issue of provocation was left to the jury.' 0 '
There are jurisdictions such as Missouri ' 0 2 which adhere to the rule
that an injury to a relative is equivalent to an injury to the defendant for
purposes of determining provocation.'0° A wounding of one's friend may
not be sufficient in Missouri 'o4 but there is dictum to the effect that an
illegal arrest of one's relative may be adequate provocation. 105
The other states run the gamut on this question all the way from an
Alabama court holding that provocation to be adequate must at least
amount to personal violence, 10 6 to an Illinois decision which held that it
was manslaughter when a father, who heard that the deceased slapped his
child, killed him because of it.' 0 7 There are courts which refuse to mitigate
a crime to manslaughter when the evidence shows that a father committed
homicide after witnessing a beating inflicted upon his son,108 while the
same court has indicated that it would have considered the crime manslaughter had the beating been inflicted upon the slayer. 0 9 Other jurisdictions appear to be more liberal in their concept of what constitutes adequate provocation. In Toler v. State 110 the highest court of Tennessee reversed a murder conviction and held as a matter of law that the evidence
indicated manslaughter. The facts showed that the killing took place
after the defendant had been told that the deceased had sexually assaulted his daughter. The Supreme Court of Kentucky went even further
when it held that the situation in Campbell v. Commonwealth "'1was a
clear case of manslaughter. There, the defendant's daughter was the wife
of the deceasel. On the night in question the defendant was told that the
deceased had had an argument with defendant's daughter and had locked
her out of the house. The defendant, after finding this fact to be true,
gained admittance to the deceased's house and shot and killed him. The
court in affirming a conviction of manslaughter likened these circumstances
to the case of the husband who pursues the adulterer and takes his life. 12
101. Commonwealth v. Palermo, 368 Pa. 28, 81 A.2d 540 (1951)
found his sister in tears.).

102. State v. Rennison, 306 Mo. 473, 267 S.W. 850 (1924).
103. Missouri, which appears to be liberal in this area of

(Defendant

provocation, follows

the rule that an assault without a battery is never sufficient provocation. See text at
note 37 upra. It seems somewhat paradoxical to say that a reasonable man is provoked by an assault and battery upon his cousin but is not provoked by an assault
upon himself.

104. State v. Delbono, 306 Mo. 553, 268 S.W. 60 (1924) (dictum).
105. State v. Burnett, 357 Mo. 106, 206 S.W.2d 345 (1947).
106. Reese v. State, 90 Ala. 624, 627, 8 So. 818, 819 (1891).
107. People v. Rice, 351 Ill. 604, 609, 184 N.E. 894, 896 (1933).
108. E.g., Hickox v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. 649, 655, 285 S.W. 621, 623 (1926).
109. Roebuck v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 112, 117, 18 S.W.2d 643, 645-46 (1929).
110. 152 Tenn. 1, 260 S.W. 134 (1924). Cf. Mize v. State, 135 Ga. 291, 297-98,
69 S.E. 173, 176 (1910) (dictum), where the court reversed a murder conviction
under similar facts because the trial court refused to give a manslaughter instruction.

111. 88 Ky. 402, 11 S.W. 290 (1889).
112. 88 Ky. at 413, 11 S.W. at 293.
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Trespass Upon Property

In nineteenth century England trespass to property was sufficient provToday, although one auocation to reduce murder to manslaughter.'"
no
mere
trespass upon the land
well
settled
that
thority states that "it is
or goods of another is sufficient to reduce an intentional killing to manslaughter," 114 there are still some remnants of the old English doctrine.
The law in Florida appears to be that "whoever kills in hot blood, and heat
of passion, a trespasser, [sic] shall be guilty of manslaughter." "- There
is also authority in Kentucky and Tennessee to support this proposition." 6
In Oklahoma it appears that a person who kills a trespasser in an attempt
to eject him from the premises will be guilty of no greater crime than
manslaughter without any inquiry into whether the trespass provoked a
state of passion." 7 It is therefore apparent that the issue of the adequacy
of provocation, as it pertains to trespass to property, is far from a settled
matter.
REFLECTIONS ON WHAT THaE LAW SHOULD BE

The above discussion has attempted to indicate the consequences of
adopting an objective standard when dealing with an area of the law concerned entirely with the state of men's minds at the time a crime of passion
has been committed. Every jurisdiction throughout the United States has
for almost a century looked to the same "reasonable man" for guidance.
His answers to the question of how he would react to a given set of circumstances have varied as he stepped from one jurisdiction to another.
In some states, if he has suffered an assault, it will be sufficient provocation to reduce his killing to manslaughter; 118 in others he must have
been the victim of an assault and battery before his blood reaches the heat
necessary to dispel any malice from his system; 119 and in still other situations, even if an assault and battery has been committed upon his person,
he may still as a matter of law be judged guilty of murder. 2 0
We find this diversity of decision in almost every other situation
in which the question of the adequacy of provocation is raised.

The reason-

able man tells us that he does not become sufficiently provoked when his
California' 2 ' or Georgia m or Iowa 123wife tells him that she has been
113. Coldiron, Historical Developnwnt of Manslaughter, 38 Ky. L.J. 527, 543

(1950).

114. See CLARx & MARSHALL, CRIaSs 349 (5th ed. 1952), where only one
American case is cited for this "well settled" proposition. Independent research has
revealed few cases which stand for this rule of law.
115. Pearce v. State, 154 Fla. 656, 657, 18 So. 2d 754, 755 (1944).

116. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beverly, 237 Ky. 35, 34 S.W.2d 941 (1931);
Wooten v. State, 171 Tenn. 362, 103 S.W.2d 324 (1937).

117. See Hovis v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 299, 176 P.2d 833 (1947).
118. See text at notes 28-30 supra.
119. See text at notes 25-27 supra.

120. See text at note 31 supra.
121. See text and note at note 67 supra.
122. Ibid.

123. See text and note at note 68 supra.
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unfaithful but the provocation becomes unbearable when the scene is shifted
to Kentucky, 24 Mississippi, 12 or South Carolina.'- 6
Why do we not discard this individual who has added nothing but
confusion to the law and turn the jury's attention toward the subjective
inquiry of the state of the individual defendant's mind at the time of the
commission of the homicide?
In 1879 a Pennsylvania court 1 2 7 answered one defendant's request that
they take his physical and mental condition into consideration by stating:
"It will easily be seen that the adoption of such a rule would
result in the encouragement of vicious habits, for it would make evil
the palliative of crime, and vice would become an excuse for its own
fruits. As yet, in Pennsylvania, a theory so fraught with injury to the
community, finds no place in its criminal jurisprudence, and it is to be
hoped it never will." 128
This response was in effect repeated in the same jurisdiction almost forty
years later in the case of Commonweattl v. Webb.129 The trend was continued in the federal courts when in 1942 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia,12 0 in affirming a conviction of murder in the second
degree, commented that:
"While sympathy might at first glance suggest a more lenient
rule for persons of low mentality or unstable emotions, the result
would be disastrous in the uncertainty of its application. The rule
suggested by appellant [taking into account his mental condition]
would become a refuge for ill-tempered, irresponsible citizens; it would
put a premium upon lack of self-control and would penalize the reasonable man, the average man, the prudent man, because of the restraint which he practices in his dealings with his fellows." '11
The prime objection to such reasoning is that it does not logically follow that because the courts will treat an individual of an excitable nature
more lightly than one who is phlegmatic, excitable people will take advantage of this judicial kindness and commit homicide. A finding of
actual provocation to a state of passion only reduces the killing to man124. See text and note at note 70 supra.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Small v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 304 (1879).
128. Id. at 308 (dictum).
129. 252 Pa. 187, 97 Atl. 189 (1916) : "The adoption of such a rule would put
a premium on uncontrolled temper and would, in effect, hold that one whose disposition is unusually excitable or quarrelsome, or who has less will power and selfcontrol than persons usually possess, should be kept to a less strict accountability
for his acts than the more moderate and evenly-balanced citizen." Id. at 19, 97
Atl. at 191.
130. Hart v. United States, 130 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
131. Id. at 458.
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slaughter. This is far from a consequence of absolute acquittal or a token
sentence. There are many jurisdictions in which manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment up to twenty-one years,132 a few in which the defendant may receive as much as thirty years,'1 and one, Vermont, where
a voluntary manslaughter conviction may be punishable by life imprisonment. 34 This "light" treatment is not exactly an open invitation to homicide. It might also be suggested that if such homicides are committed by
excitable people consumed by the heat of passion, it is unlikely that such
individuals could or would stop to consider the legal consequences of their
act before they engage in its commission.135
It further appears that the argument that a change from the reasonable man standard would "encourage evil habits" or "put a premium upon
lack of self-control" does not address itself to the question under scrutiny.
The issue before the courts in these situations is whether the evidence
is sufficient to support a finding that the acts of the defendant were committed in the manner and accompanied by the mental state declared by the
legislature to be the elements of the crime of murder. This inquiry calls
for a determination of whether or not the homicide was committed with
malice aforethought. If this element is not present, the crime can be no
greater than manslaughter. 1 6 The question to be answered is whether
defendant's act was in fact so completely controlled by passion that there
was an absence of malice aforethought. This is a problem of subjective
inquiry; there is no room for the reasonable man's inconsistencies.
It is understandable that a nineteenth century court might regard
the state of knowledge of the operation of men's minds and their reactions
to varying causation as too meager to permit the jury to make a reasonably accurate factual inference on this question from the evidence presented to them. It may well have been that at that time a verdict rendered on this issue would represent little more than the sympathies of the
individual jurymen. To confine their power to return such an arbitrary
determination, it was deemed necessary to limit the issue to an inquiry into
a proper standard of conduct, i.e., the reasonable man test. The concrete
categories devised were a further measure to restrict jury speculation. It
would seem that today the state of scientific learning has increased to the
point where the lay finders of fact are sufficiently equipped, with the aid of
expert testimony to guide them, to make the necessary determination in
132. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.07 (1944); GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-1008 (1935);
IND. GCRM. CODM § 10-3405 (Bums 1956); Ky. Rrv. STAT. § 435.020 (1948); R.I.
GxN. LAws c. 606, § 3 (1938).
133. E.g., Da. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, § 575 (1953) ; N.H. RAV. STAT. ANN. c. 585:11
(1955).
134. See VT. Rzv. STAT. § 8243 (1947).
135. See opposite position in Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide, 37 CoLum. L. Rv. 701, 736 (1937).

136. The traditional statute defines manslaughter as the killing of a human being
without malice aforethought. See note 13 supra. See, in particular, the Georgia
manslaughter statute which to a great extent codifies the common law on the subject
without using the term "reasonable man."

GA. CODE

ANN. § 26-1007 (1935).
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each case. Reference to the type of provocation appears nowhere in the
definition of the crime of manslaughter. The provocation is only significant in answering the question of whether it is believed that the slayer was
actually aroused to such a state that his mental processes were possessed by
passion and not reason. Although the psychiatrist is here to stay, the
law chooses to ignore him. The state of the defendant's mind remains of
secondary importance. The device originally invented to aid in this
inquiry has become the standard of an individual man's guilt for his actions.
Fear by the courts that a failure to employ the ancient test will lead to disastrous results in the form of undesirable social conduct is in reality directed
toward the adequacy of the deterrent effect of the legislatively provided punishment for those who commit manslaughter rather than at the definition
of the crime itself.
In a somewhat analogous area of the criminal law, the courts are
gradually beginning to recognize the need for psychiatric testimony. There
are occasions where the mental makeup of the defendant is brought into
issue when the question arises as to whether or not he had the capacity to
premeditate and deliberate for purposes of holding him responsible for first
degree murder. There are at least a dozen jurisdictions which allow such
evidence to be presented and which call for appropriate instructions to
the jury on this subject. 13 7 However, in Fisher v. United States,s a
leading decision on this question, the United States Supreme Court refused
to go along with this trend.
Fisher was a Negro of low intelligence who worked in a library in
the District of Columbia. The deceased was a member of the staff. On
prior occasions the deceased had complained to the defendant's superior
about his work and on the day in question informed the defendant that
she was going to tell his superior that he was lazy. In addition she
called him "a black nigger." Upon hearing this epithet the defendant
slapped her and when she started to scream he applied pressure to her
throat in an attempt to keep her quiet. When this failed to halt her
screams, the defendant stabbed her. In affirming a conviction of murder
in the first degree, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not
err in refusing to instruct the jury that the defendant's mental facility
was to be taken into account when considering the questions of premeditation and deliberation.
Justice Murphy, who along with Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge
contended that the trial judge should have charged the jury with respect
to the defendant's mental condition, stated that:
"[T]here are persons who, while not totally insane, possess such
low mental powers as to be incapable of the deliberation and premeditation requisite to statutory first degree murder. Yet under the rule
137. See Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 473-74 n.12 (1946) ; see also note
19 supra.
138. 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
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adopted by the court below, the jury must either condemn such persons to death on the false premise that they possess the mental requirements of a first degree murderer or free them completely from
criminal responsibility and turn them loose among society. The jury
is forbidden to find them guilty of a lesser degree of murder by reason
of their generally weakened or disordered intellect." 189
Justice Murphy's words appear to apply equally well to those defendants who are more easily provoked than the ordinary reasonable
man. Such individuals must be found guilty of murder on the false premise
that they possess the same temperament as the ordinary person, or they
must be freed completely and turned loose among society.
CONCLUSION

After many years of hiding behind the reasonable man, it is time that
the law recognized the fact that the crucial issue in every homicide case
is the state of the mind of the slayer and that it is the psychiatrist and not
the reasonable man who will help the courts determine what that is. The
twelve reasonable men on the jury should direct their talents at an attempt
to determine the credibility of the psychiatrist rather than to project themselves into a factual situation to determine the state of the mind of an
individual whose mental makeup may be entirely different from their own.
A Texas court 140 in 1914 accurately described the state of the law as it
existed at that time and as it continues to exist today. The court said
that " . . . it has always been held that if there be no legal 'adequate
cause' to produce the state of mind, such as anger, rage, sudden resentment or terror, even if such state of mind does exist, the offense is not manslaughter, but murder in the second degree." 1 41 Can we as reasonable men
continue to adhere to this doctrine? Is it reasonable to contend that if the
law says that you do not become adequately provoked under a given state
of facts, then even if you do become so provoked, the law will refuse to
recognize your passion? It is time that the criminal courts left the nineteenth century doctrines behind and made some progress toward a more
enlightened administration of criminal justice. The penologists have
adopted twentieth century ideas in an attempt to rehabilitate rather than
punish those who are now convicted of crimes. The way is open for the
courts to discontinue the practice of sending those guilty of manslaughter
to institutions under the pretense that they require as long a time to become
rehabilitated as those who are guilty of murder.
M.D. G.
139. 328 U.S. at 492.
140. Johnson v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 179, 167 S.W. 733 (1914).
141. Id. at 187, 167 S.W. at 737. (Emphasis added.)

